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Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States has conducted the 
missions of Homeland Security and Defense abroad, rather than within its borders.  
While keeping conflict outside of our borders is preferred, the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001 have illustrated that this is not always possible.  The 
missions of Maritime Homeland Security and Defense have gained significant 
importance in the overall national security of the United States.  In order to effectively 
support these missions, an effective intelligence apparatus must exist which is adapted to 
the Information Age.  Terrorist groups are using the network forms of organization, with 
significant advantages over traditional hierarchies within the U.S. government.  
Effectively organizing the various agencies involved in domestic maritime intelligence 
will require rapid movement of intelligence to the operational customer.  The most 
effective way to organize these agencies to support Maritime Homeland Security and 
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Throughout recent history, the United States has focused its Homeland Security 
and Defense missions away from the domestic theater.  A new threat dimension has 
arisen from the Information Age, which now challenges the United States in its own 
backyard.  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 illustrate the seriousness of this 
new threat environment.  Within this new atmosphere of significant domestic terrorist 
threat, the missions of MHLS and MHLD have risen in importance as never before.  
Intelligence support to each mission forces a significant change in the way that the 
intelligence community conducts business.  A new way of organizing the intelligence 
community can yield significant advances in support to MHLS and MHLD.  This 
reorganization must develop a highly networked domestic maritime intelligence 
community. 
While the missions of HLS and HLD reflect certain differences in definition, the 
overall goal of each is to protect the homeland of the United States against terrorist 
attacks.  The recent creations of DHS and USNORTHCOM have provided a C2 structure 
with which to conduct these two missions.  Under each respective command, USCG has 
the lead for MHLS and NAVNORTH takes over when conducting MHLD.  The resulting 
C2 organizations for both MHLS and MHLD are hierarchal in nature. 
The theory of Netwar, as described by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 
describes the evolution of network organizations based on advances made in the 
information revolution.  This theory proposes a progression towards the complex all-
channel network form.  Hierarchies have significant difficulty fighting networks.  
Therefore, with the enemy defined as a hybrid all-channel terrorist network targeting the 
homeland of the U.S., it will become increasingly difficult for a hierarchal intelligence 
community to effectively monitor and predict this enemy’s likely courses of action.   
With all of these ideas put together, it is clear that organizational change must 
occur in intelligence support to MHLS and MHLD.  This thesis argues that the most 
effective way to organize these intelligence communities is to merge them both into a 
domestic maritime intelligence network. 
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To monitor and predict enemy actions in MHLS and MHLD, a hybrid form of the 
all-channel network should be developed for use by the domestic maritime intelligence 
community.  This network should be all-channel in form, with certain hub network nodes.  
In addition, the ability to tailor, filter, and fuse information at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels must be implemented.  In order to effectively accomplish this task, 
domestic maritime intelligence must attain a joint-interagency form.  The foundation 
beneath this intelligence network encompasses the formal implementation of three main 
ideas: 
 Willingness to actively share information at all levels. 
 Creation of formal liaison and interagency communication. 
 Elimination of the competitive paradigm between intelligence agencies. 
The implementation of these ideas will allow a hybrid all-channel network to form in 
support of MHLS and MHLD. 
Within the network, each warfare level must be supported with dedicated 
intelligence fusion.  NMIC should be a dedicated node within the network, responsible 
for fusing intelligence at the strategic level.  MIFC-LANT and MIFC-PAC should be the 
two nodes in the network primarily focusing on fusion at the operational level.  Finally, at 
the tactical port level, each port should have a JHOC which is responsible for monitoring 
activity within each port.  As with the concept of the all-channel network, all of these 
nodes must become interconnected, so exchange of information can occur between all 
levels of intelligence support. 
The current intelligence organization has three major issues which impact its 
ability to adequately support MHLS and MHLD:  
 Organizational structure 
 Information systems 
 Misconceptions of the missions 
Within each of these areas there are significant shortfalls which endanger the homeland 
maritime domain awareness each day.  By developing a maritime intelligence network,  
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creating effective sensors and communications, and truly understanding the missions of 
MHLS and MHLD, the country can begin to efficiently develop a safer domestic 



















I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States has conducted the 
missions of Homeland Security and Defense abroad, rather than within its borders.  The 
defense of American citizens and interests has often led to conflict on foreign soil.  While 
keeping conflict outside of our borders is preferred, the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001 have illustrated that this is not always possible.  American citizens 
expect and demand an effective domestic security and defense system in this new threat 
environment.  Therefore, the intelligence community must redefine its role in defense of 
the homeland, and take steps to reorganize to sufficiently support the missions of 
Homeland Security and Defense. 
Within the realm of Homeland Security and Defense lies the domestic maritime 
theater.  The missions of Maritime Homeland Security (MHLS) and Maritime Homeland 
Defense (MHLD) are vital to the national security of the United States.  Given the large 
number of organizations involved, intelligence support to these missions requires a great 
deal of reorganization and improved interoperability.  While it is important to 
acknowledge the current organizational doctrine for the intelligence community, the 
intent of this thesis is to provide insight into needed improvements to intelligence 
organizations which will help define the renewed national focus on MHLS and MHLD.  
The overall objective is to provide answers to the following questions: 
 How should intelligence support to MHLS and MHLD be organized in order to 
best support the strategic, operational, and tactical environments?  What are the 
roles and responsibilities of Coast Guard Intelligence and Naval Intelligence in 
MHLS and MHLD? 
 What gaps and obstacles exist in the current intelligence organizational structure 
that might impede the missions of MHLS and MHLD? 
The overall idea involved in answering these questions is that intelligence support 
to both MHLS and MHLD is essentially the same.  Effectively organizing the various 
agencies involved in supporting these missions will require rapid movement of 
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intelligence to the operational customer.  The most effective way to organize these 
agencies to support MHLS and MHLD is to create a maritime intelligence network. 
 
B. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
Chapter II reviews the roles and responsibilities of various organizations within 
MHLS and MHLD, as defined by the President of the United States.  Homeland Security 
and Homeland Defense are defined and related to the maritime environment.  
Importantly, the Command and Control (C2) structure is presented in order to identify 
combatant commanders and lead organizations for each mission.  While the intelligence 
organizational structure should not be dependent on which commander is being 
supported, it is important to outline the focus and flow of the intelligence support to each 
mission. 
Chapter III examines the theories of network organizations.  It discusses the 
various types of networks and how they operate.  The chapter compares hierarchal 
organizations to networks and points out the advantages of networks over hierarchies.  In 
addition, the chapter will reveal how the perceived enemy is most likely organized, and 
how the intelligence organizational structure supporting MHLS and MHLD must be a 
network in order to be successful. 
Chapter IV presents an organizational blueprint to effectively make MHLS and 
MHLD intelligence into a successful network.  It defines roles and responsibilities of all 
intelligence organizations within the network to support the strategic, operational, and 
tactical environments.  This chapter defines the roles of Coast Guard and Naval 
Intelligence to develop a Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) for the domestic maritime 
theater.  It also provides insights into the current gaps and obstacles in the current 
organizational structure, and provides recommendations to remedy these shortfalls. 
Chapter V provides a conclusion to the discussions made in the previous chapters.  
It summarizes the analysis of the MLHS and MHLD intelligence process and provides 
some key points which appear vital to creating an effective intelligence organization that 
supports each mission. 
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II. MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE 
COMMAND AND CONTROL; DEFINING THE CUSTOMER 
A. DEFINITIONS 
Homeland Security is defined as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur”1 in the National Strategy 
For Homeland Security, released in July 2002.  Essentially, this definition outlines a 
mission requirement to prepare for and proactively prevent terrorist attacks in the U.S. on 
a day-to-day basis.  Therefore, MHLS represents any element of the HLS mission which 
occurs in the domestic maritime theater. 
According to General Military Training Homeland Defense, Homeland Defense 
is defined as “the protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population and 
critical infrastructure through deterrence of and defense against direct attacks as well as 
management of the consequences of such attacks”2.  This definition creates a mission to 
respond to imminent attacks on the homeland, and if necessary, respond to attacks which 
have already occurred.  This makes MHLD the execution of the HLD mission in the 
domestic maritime theater. 
An important point to understand about HLS and HLD is that both missions 
support the same goal in the end, protection of the homeland of the United States.  The 
main difference lies in the execution of each mission. 
 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) 
According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) has the lead role in conducting Homeland Security.  As a result of the 
establishment of DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) transitions from the Department of 
                                                 
1 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security.  p. 2.  Government Printing 
Office.  July 2002. 
2 Chief of Naval Education and Training, General Military Training Homeland Defense.  p. 1-5-4.  
Government Printing Office.  2003. 
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Transportation to DHS.  From a maritime prospective, the Coast Guard represents the 
lead element within DHS to conduct the mission of MHLS.   
Similarly, the Department of Defense (DOD) is directed to assume the lead role in 
conducting Homeland Defense.  As a result of this act, the newly-established unified 
command U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is given the responsibility to 
conduct the mission of Homeland Defense.  This thesis will identify USNORTHCOM as 
the representative of DOD in Homeland Defense discussions.  Under HLD conditions, 
the U.S. Navy (USN) normally acts as the lead organization for conducting MHLD under 
USNORTHCOM.  
From a joint military operations perspective, the situation is best described in 
terms of the “Supported Commander” and the “Supporting Commander”.  When the 
country is conducting the HLS mission, DHS is the “Supported Commander” and 
USNORTHCOM is the “Supporting Commander”.  Conversely, when the country is 
conducting the HLD mission, USNORTHCOM becomes the “Supported Commander” 
and DHS becomes the “Supporting Commander”.  From a doctrinal perspective, the 
resulting structure gives the Coast Guard the lead in conducting MHLS, and the Navy the 
lead in conducting MHLD. 
This reorganization creates a great deal of ambiguity as to when HLS should 
transition to HLD, and when it should transition back again.  Since there are different 
agencies taking the lead for each mission, it is often unclear who should be in charge 
under some circumstance.  Differentiating between the two missions projects which 
agency should take charge, however the decisive point between them is often difficult to 
interpret, as has been demonstrated in war games.3  This is obviously an operational 
concern, however, it should not impact the intelligence process.  Since the missions of 
HLS and HLD support the same end goal, the intelligence support to each mission is 
identical.  The only difference lies in which commander, or “customer”, is the focus of 
the intelligence flow.  One of the key concepts to understand in the world of MHLS and 
MHLD is that the intelligence process supporting each mission is the same. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Maritime Homeland Security and Defense War Game.  Naval Postgraduate School.  2003. 
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C. CURRENT MHLD C2 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
As was stated before, USNORTHCOM has the responsibility of conducting 
MHLD according to the implemented modifications to the Unified Command Plan on 
October 1, 2002.  This established USNORTHCOM Headquarters at Peterson AFB in 
Colorado Springs, CO.  As with any unified command, the command structure of 
USNORTHCOM is divided into component commanders which reflect the basic 
missions within USNORTHCOM.  These component commanders are the Joint Forces 
Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), Joint Forces Air Component Commander 
(JFACC), and the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC).  Each of these 
organizations have their subcomponents, however, the C2 structure for the JFMCC is the 
only one that will be presented here, since the concentration is on the mission of MHLD.   
One important and unique difference between USNORTHCOM and the other 
unified commands is that it has no forces regularly assigned to it.  Therefore, 
USNORTHCOM represents a “skeleton” infrastructure which has no ability to conduct 
operations without the explicit authorization of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).4  
Without any forces actually assigned to USNORTHCOM, it is sometimes difficult to 
understand the component commands due to the fact that the staff organizations involved 
often have several names and responsibilities to other commanders until SECDEF 
authorization is given to assign forces to USNORTHCOM. 
The JFMCC for USNORTHCOM is one of these organizations with several 
names, missions, and commanders.  The actual name given to the USNORTHCOM 
JFMCC is US Naval Forces Northern Command (NAVNORTH), located in Norfolk, VA.  
This command is also known as Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) and 
Commander US Atlantic Fleet (CLF), and is regularly assigned for control under Joint 
Forces Command (JFCOM) until forces are assigned to USNORTHCOM.  Further 
discussion will refer to the JFMCC as NAVNORTH in order to avoid further confusion, 
since the topic at hand is MHLD.  It is important to note that Coast Guard forces can be 
assigned to a JFMCC according to the Unified Command Plan.  CFFC and CLF are 
solely Navy organizations.  In addition, with USN taking the lead in MHLD under  
                                                 
4 USNORTHCOM.  “Who We Are-Our Team”.  www.northcom.mil.   July 2003. 
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USNORTHCOM, NAVNORTH will be the organization within USN which will conduct 
MHLD.  Figure 1 illustrates the domain for which USNORTHCOM and its 
subcomponents have responsibility. 
6 
 Figure 1.   USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility. 
 
 
Source:  www.defenselink.mil 
 
Subcomponents of NAVNORTH have been broken down into NAVNORTH 
Fleet East (NAVNORTHFLT-E), located in Norfolk, VA, and NAVNORTH Fleet West 
(NAVNORTHFLT-W), located in San Diego, CA.  This organizational method assigns 
responsibility to each continental US coast to a different subcommander.  These 
organizations also have other names and responsibilities until forces are assigned to 
USNORTHCOM.  NAVNORTHFLT-E is also known as Commander Second Fleet 
(C2F), which is regularly assigned control under Commander US Atlantic Fleet (CLF).  
NAVNORTHFLT-W has a similar arrangement, being also called Commander Third 
Fleet (C3F).  However, C3F regularly operates under Commander US Pacific Fleet (CPF) 
and US Pacific Command (USPACOM).5  Figure 2 illustrates how these component 
commands are organized under USNORTHCOM during MHLD missions. 
                                                 
5 USNORTHCOM MDA Conference.  USNORTHCOM.  2003. 
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Source:  USNORTHCOM MDA Conference 
 
The resulting organizational structure within USNORTHCOM is very hierarchal 
in nature, and often quite confusing due to the fact that no forces are assigned on a 
regular basis.  In addition, component and subcomponent commanders under 
USNORTHCOM have competing responsibilities to other Unified Commands until 
actually assigned the mission of MHLD.  Many problems result from this structure, 
including training, funding, and C2 in general.  The problems in the operational C2 
organizational structure are not the overall focus of this research, since the thesis 
discussion analyzes the intelligence organizational structure supporting MHLD.  
However, it is important to note that the operational C2 organization is the “customer” of 
the intelligence, and thus any shortfalls within that organization will affect the 
intelligence process. 
 
D. CURRENT MHLS C2 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The creation of DHS, and the assignment of USCG to DHS, gave USCG the lead 
in the MHLS mission.  Due to the Coast Guard’s historical role in conducting MHLS, a 
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massive C2 reorganization was not required within the organization.  However, the Coast 
Guard focused much of its efforts on missions such as lifesaving, environmental security, 
and navigation.  After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, MHLS became the highest 
priority.  In addition, forces are regularly assigned under USCG, and therefore 
component and subcomponent commands do not have multiple names and commanders.  
This makes the C2 process under USCG more clear and practiced.  The Commandant of 
the Coast Guard represents DHS in the MHLS mission. 
Much like the NAVNORTHFLT-E/W organizations, USCG is broken down into 
component commands for each coast.  Commander USCG Atlantic Area (LANTAREA), 
located in Portsmouth, VA, directs USCG operations on the east coast of the US and in 
the the Gulf of Mexico.  Commander USCG Pacific Area (PACAREA), located in 
Alameda, CA, directs USCG operations on the west coast of the US, to include Alaska, 
Hawaii, and the Eastern Pacific region.  These commanders are regularly assigned forces, 
and report directly to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 
Subcomponents exist within both LANTAREA and PACAREA, known as USCG 
Districts.  LANTAREA commands Districts 1, 5, 7, 8, and 9 (D-1, D-5, D-7, D-8, and D-
9).  PACAREA commands Districts 11, 13, 14, and 17 (D-11, D-13, D-14, and D-17).6  
These districts also carry out responsibility and authority over inland bodies of water and 
waterways.  Figure 3 illustrates the Area of Responsibility for USCG and its 











                                                 
6 USNORTHCOM MDA Conference. 
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Figure 3.   USCG Areas of Responsibility. 
 
 










D-5 D-7 D-8 D-9 D-11 D-13 D-14 D-17D-1 
Source:  USNORTHCOM MDA Conference 
 
Once again, the organizational structure under USCG is a hierarchy.  Although 
the chain of command is not as confusing as USNORTHCOM, and training and funding 
are not affected by it, the C2 process for this type of organization will still have problems 
confronting network organizations.  It is worth repeating that while the operational C2 
structure is not being analyzed in this study, it does however, have direct implications on 
intelligence support to this “customer” as well.   
 
E. SUMMARY 
The definitions of HLS and HLD illustrate that the overall goal resulting from 
each mission is the same, protection of the homeland of the United States.  While 
execution of each mission is conducted under different authority, it is important to 
understand which organization is in charge in order to decide where intelligence support 
must be provided in a given situation.  It is quite clear that both the new DHS and new 
11 
USNORTHCOM are organized into hierarchal forms.  This is an operational issue which 
can have negative repercussions given the network organization of the enemy.  However, 
these examples are only provided to illustrate the “customer” of intelligence support to 
MHLS and MHLD.  The true intent of this study is to show that by creating an MHLS 
and MHLD intelligence network, it will prove to bring impressive clarity to the 




III. UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD OF NETWAR AND 
NETWORK ORGANIZATIONS 
A. THE THEORY OF NETWAR 
The discussions in this chapter revolve around an emerging method of 
organizational theory known as “Netwar”.  John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt define 
Netwar as “an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of 
traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization 
and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age”7.  This 
idea is fed by the ongoing advances in information technology, but is more about 
organizational practice than technology itself.  The revolution in information technology 
favors and strengthens the network organizational principle, and leaves traditional 
hierarchal organizations at a disadvantage.8  Therefore, as the technology advances and is 
used, organizational structure should reflect more efficient ways of using these 
technologies in order to gain the advantage. 
Grasping the concept of Netwar forces one to look at the world from a different 
perspective.  In warfare, the hierarchal pyramid dominates the development of historical 
military structure.  In fact, great historical success in global conflict has been attained by 
using this form of organization.  It is easy to take the view that changing a historically 
successful organizational practice may lead to a self-created disadvantage.  However, 
after viewing the drastically changed global environment resulting from growth patterns 
in the Information Age, it is clear that the future favors a revolution in organizational 
doctrine. 
 
B. TYPES OF NETWORKS 
Networks are comprised of a series of “nodes” which have some ability to pass 
information.  Nodes represent people, places, or organizations that have contact with 
                                                 
7 Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D., Networks and Netwars, p. 6.  RAND, 2001. 
8 Arquilla, 1. 
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other nodes for information flow.  These nodes can be connected through three major 
types of networks; the chain network, the hub network, and the all-channel network.9 
The chain or line network is a series of nodes in a line where information passes 
from one node to the next.  Figure 5 shows a visual diagram of the chain network 
structure.  No information passes directly from one end to the other without passing 
through intermediate nodes.10  This type of network is fairly simple to create in terms of 
communication technology.  It also can possess a sense of confidentiality between 
different ends and nodes since direct communication only occurs with the two adjacent 
nodes.  As a result of this series of communication relays, information flow can be 
slowed and become inaccurate as it passes through each node from end to end.  In 
addition, information flow can be disrupted easily by breaking a link or node in the chain 
network.  Overall, the chain network is the simplest to set up, however, the slowest and 
most vulnerable to disruption. 
 
Figure 5.   Chain Network Structure. 
 
Source:  Networks and Netwars 
 
The hub, star, or wheel network form uses a central node, or hub, which is 
connected to several other nodes.  Figure 6 illustrates the structure of the hub network.  
                                                 
9 Arquilla, 7-8. 
10 Arquilla, 7. 
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The resulting organization forces all communications to go through the central node.  It is 
important to clarify that the central node is not a hierarchy, but a common center for 
information flow between the other nodes in the network.11  The hub network is a bit 
more complex in terms of coordinating information passing from origin to destination 
through the hub.  It also allows for faster coordination of information flowing to and from 
multiple sources without the long trail of nodes present in the chain network.  
Simultaneous communication to several nodes from the hub is possible, which creates 
faster flow and more accurate common knowledge between all nodes.  The hub requires 
more diverse communication technology in order to keep up with where information is 
coming from, and where it needs to go.  In addition, centralizing the communication hub 
to a single point of vulnerability makes the network depend on the preservation of the 
hub.  This presents a clear target to disable the network if the hub can be identified.  
Overall, the hub network allows for a faster flow rate and common picture, however, it 
requires more complex technology and is vulnerable to attack of the hub. 
                                                 
11 Arquilla, 7. 
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 Figure 6.   Hub Network Structure. 
 
Source:  Networks and Netwars 
 
The third type of network is the all-channel or full-matrix network.  With this 
form of network, every node in the network is directly connected to every other node.12  
Figure 7 provides a simple diagram of an all-channel network, however, it is difficult to 
draw this type of network due to its three-dimensional structure.  This type of network is 
the most complex of all three forms.  Directly connecting all nodes together allows for 
extremely fast information flow from source to destination.  In addition, the entire 
network is not significantly affected if one node is targeted.  Information continues to 
flow around a node if it is eliminated.  Overall, the all-channel network is the most 
efficient means of rapidly passing information to all nodes in the network.  This 
organization requires very advanced technology in order to connect all nodes together, 
but decentralizes the network to decrease vulnerabilities to targeting. 
                                                 
12 Arquilla, 8. 
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 Figure 7.   All-channel Network Structure. 
 
Source: Networks and Netwars 
 
It is clear that each of these types of networks has its own positive and negative 
characteristics.  Each is also found within the Netwar concept, applying its strengths to 
various organizations.  In addition, hybrid networks exist, which apply two or more of 
these three basic networks into the overall organization.13  The hybrid idea allows an 
organization to tailor its network around various components within the overall network.  
Networks couple themselves with hierarchies as well.  This type of hybrid may weave 
several hierarchal organizations into a network.14  The use of hybrids can additionally 
strengthen a diverse organization by allowing it to adapt its network to support the 
various operations within the overall organization.  Also, applying multiple 
organizational concepts can provide better organizational preservation by clouding the 
targeting process. 
 
C. THE PERCEIVED ENEMY ORGANIZATION 
Netwar-related adversaries use all three types of networks based on their purposes 
and goals.  Smuggling operations often use the chain network by passing information and 
products from node to node along the chain.  The hub network is often applied at the core 
                                                 
13 Arquilla, 8. 
14 Arquilla, 8. 
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of terrorist and criminal organizations.  Militant groups often prefer the all-channel 
network to become decentralized and highly interoperable.15 
According the definitions of HLS and HLD presented earlier, the enemy is 
defined as terrorist organizations that target the homeland of the United States.  
Therefore, the enemy in the missions of MHLS and MHLD is designated as terrorist 
organizations that threaten the domestic maritime environment of the United States.  The 
key to understanding how the enemy fights is to understand how it is organized. 
As was stated earlier, terrorist organizations often use the hub network design.  
However, as the pace of the information revolution is bringing inexpensive, advanced 
information technology to the hands of the private sector, hybrid terrorist organizations 
are developing.  These terrorist groups are beginning to couple the all-channel design 
with the hub network.  The major obstacle impeding the formation of an all-channel 
network is the robust communication and information system that is required.16  
However, the increasingly vast availability of inexpensive information technology is 
making this movement much easier. 
Offensively, the hybrid organization favors flexibility and adaptability.17  The 
evolution of swarming tactics among terrorist organizations allows them to remain 
dispersed until the defining moment of attack.  This type of network makes dispersal 
even easier, and also allows the information flow which is vital to quickly culminate an 
attack on an enemy’s weak point.  Swarming allows the network to decide where and 
when confrontations will occur, thus giving the terrorists the advantage of creating 
conflict when the situation is favorable to them. 
From a defensive standpoint, the hybrid movement renders counter-leadership 
targeting ineffective.18  Examples of this are the continued activity of groups such as al-
Qaeda and Fedayeen after the apprehension of leading members of both organizations.  
By eliminating a hub node in the hub network, the overall organization can be damaged.  
                                                 
15 Arquilla, 8. 
16 Arquilla, 10. 
17 Arquilla, 12. 
18 Arquilla, 13. 
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However, by transitioning to the all-channel design, the network gains diversity and 
redundancies which can make it more resistant to attack.19 
The resulting situation creates a blending and blurring of offensive and defensive 
operations.20  “Hit and run” tactics are used which frustrate and confuse the opponent.  
Time and again, these methods give the solid advantage to the hybrid network.  To 
confuse the issue even more, the enemy’s network is non-state.  This makes it even 
harder to prosecute due to its presence over many borders.  An enemy that is networked 
in this manner holds a significant organizational advantage over the hierarchal agencies 
involved in MHLS and MHLD. 
 
D. THE NETWORK VS. THE HIERARCHY 
There are major differences between networks and hierarchies as organizational 
systems, and as with any system, there are advantages and disadvantages of each.  
However, as a whole, the network holds a much greater organizational advantage over 
the hierarchy.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt make three main points regarding networks and 
hierarchies: 
 “Hierarchies have a difficult time fighting networks.” 
 “It takes networks to fight networks.” 
 “Whoever masters the network form first and best will gain major advantages.”21 
These points ring true in various historical examples, and the technology trend is 
definitely favoring a transition in organizational behavior based on information flow 
capabilities. 
The hierarchy resembles a pyramid form in essence.  The pyramid can be broken 
down into a simplified top, middle, and bottom levels.22  At the top level is the leader, or 
small group of leaders, which forms the head of the organization.  Below the top level 
there are a significantly larger number of middle managers, with “sub-managers” that 
report to them.  Finally, the bottom level represents the workforce of the hierarchy that 
                                                 
19 Arquilla, 13. 
20 Arquilla, 13. 
21 Arquilla, 15. 
22 Wagner III, J.A. and Hollenbeck, J.R., Organizational Behavior, Securing Competitive Advantage, 
3d ed., p. 287.  Prentice Hall, 1998. 
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reports to the sub-managers.  Overall, the organization is centralized with respect to 
leadership.23  While delegation of authority usually occurs between levels, elimination of 
a leadership element can often drastically affect a hierarchy. 
 
Figure 8.   Hierarchal Structure. 
 







In contrast, the network is a very flat organization that does not resemble a 
pyramid.  The design of this type of organization is flat, without a central leadership 
element.24  In this case, leadership makes its presence known, but only in limited roles.  
There may be several leaders within a network, and the idea is to decentralize control and 
rely on initiative within the network.  Therefore the network often appears to have no 
heads, or multiple heads, depending on how it is set up.25  The overall body is governed 
by common goals.  To use the perceived enemy as an example, the overall goals are 
destruction and disruption of the domestic maritime environment.  Therefore, any actions 
aimed at those goals are in line with the organization. 
Historically, hierarchies have had a very hard time confronting network 
organizations.  Examples are drug smuggling in Columbia and the Zapatista movement in 
Mexico.26  While both forms of organizations may be governed by common goals, the 
network gains the advantage with speed and efficiency.  The hierarchy’s centralization of                                                  
23 Wagner, 287. 
24 Arquilla, 9. 
25 Arquilla, 9. 
26 Arquilla, 15. 
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control forces low-level feedback to climb the “chain of command” in order to eventually 
have a decision made at the appropriate level.  Then, the decision must make its way back 
down to the low level.  In addition, communication and coordination between different 
low-level groups must occur at the middle level.  This greatly slows the speed of 
information flow.  In addition, counter-leadership targeting can have significant impacts 
on the hierarchy by cutting off the heads of groups and leaving them with little or no 
communication and coordination. 
When supported by an effective information system, a network is much faster and 
more efficient than a hierarchy.  Since there are no top or middle levels in a network, 
communication and coordination occurs on the lower level.  This is why a network 
appears flat in design.  Since there is no “chain of command” for information to travel up 
and down, direct information flow can occur across and throughout the network.  This 
creates more efficient information flow and interoperability among the nodes.  In 
addition, counter-leadership targeting has little impact on the network since nodes are 
decentralized.  With the advantages that the network holds over the hierarchy, it is clear 
that the best way to fight a network is with another network.  This being said, it is also 
clear that mastering the network form of organization will give the ultimate advantage.27 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The Information Age is favoring network organizations more than ever before.  
The concept of Netwar has changed the world of conflict on a global level, and 
organizational adaptation must occur in order to keep up with the advances in 
information technology.  In the missions of MHLS and MHLD, the enemy is moving 
towards the highly-efficient all-channel network design by using a hybrid of the hub and 
all-channel designs.  The traditional hierarchy form will suffer continual defeats in the 
future if it encounters networked adversaries, given the information advances being made 
every day.  The best way to effectively monitor and oppose networked terrorist 
organizations is to network the MHLS and MHLD intelligence mechanisms.  The first to 
master the network organization will ultimately be successful in reaching its goals.  
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IV. THE DOMESTIC MARITIME INTELLIGENCE NETWORK; 
ORGANIZING TO EFFECTIVELY MONITOR THE ENEMY 
A. AN INTELLIGENCE NETWORK FOR MHLS AND MHLD 
To keep up with the emerging domestic threat environment associated with 
Netwar, it is imperative that the intelligence support to MHLS and MHLD be organized 
with the ability to keep up with the enemy’s terrorist network.  By looking at the 
organizational structures of DHS and USNORTHCOM, it is clear that both organizations 
are hierarchal in form.  It is also clear that the perceived enemy structure is highly 
networked.  Based on discussions made earlier about the difficulty hierarchies have 
fighting networks, the best organizational method to counter the perceived enemy is to 
network the forces involved in defending against the threat.   
While the operational structure should be adapted as well, the point of this 
research is to provide insights into networking the intelligence support to MHLS and 
MHLD.  In order to effectively monitor and predict enemy actions that threaten the 
domestic maritime environment, a hybrid form of the all-channel network should be 
implemented in the domestic maritime intelligence organization supporting both 
missions.  This network must have the capability to support the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels within the domestic maritime environment.  While support to each warfare 
level is not always clear and direct in an all-channel network, some dedicated support to 
each warfare level is important in order to provide continual situational awareness.  This 
all-channel hybrid requires hub network components, and components capable of 
tailoring and filtering relevant intelligence for missions they support within the overall 
network. 
 
B. THE FOUNDATION OF DOMESTIC MARITIME INTELLIGENCE 
A joint-interagency environment is vital to building a domestic maritime 
intelligence network.  The structure of joint-interagency relationships must formally exist 
in theory, doctrine, and practice.  Culturally, this is a very difficult undertaking because 
the various hierarchal agencies within the U.S. government have traditions of competition 
with peer intelligence organizations.  However, the reluctance to share intelligence, or 
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even identify a customer for certain intelligence, was a principal contributor to the 
outcome of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.   
The Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) concept, which was implemented to 
support counter-drug operations, offers an approach that would work well for MHLS and 
MHLD intelligence as well.  This design creates formal relationships between all 
agencies involved in the mission, and cements communication and liaison circuits into a 
network.  Overall, three main ideas must be formally implemented in order to develop a 
foundation with which to build a domestic maritime intelligence network: 
 Willingness to actively share information at all levels. 
 Creation of formal liaison and interagency communication. 
 Elimination of the competitive paradigm between intelligence agencies. 
The sharing of information between various agencies is extremely important in 
the domestic maritime environment, given the many jurisdictions and agencies involved.  
Guidelines implemented by Intelligence Oversight and Posse Comatatus do not impact 
sharing information related to terrorist activity between law enforcement and intelligence 
organizations.  Therefore, information sharing between these organizations can and must 
occur, in order to effectively monitor and predict terrorist actions.  Failing to pass along 
relevant intelligence in a timely manner will create additional vulnerabilities as the 
terrorist networks adapt their swarming tactics to find perceived gaps in the intelligence 
flow.  
The creation of formal liaison and communication between agencies is a 
necessary process in order to encourage and strengthen information sharing.  Liaison 
allows for a direct communication path between agencies.  It provides better knowledge 
of intelligence capabilities, and clearly defines relevant information from agency to 
agency.  Communication and information systems must be standardized or made 
compatible from agency to agency as well.  This will allow information to pass to the 
agency needing it, and is also a vital component of an all-channel network.  Strong and 
frequent communication among all agencies will allow intelligence to flow with the 
speed and efficiency of the all-channel network.   
Finally, competitive intelligence does not have any role in MHLS and MHLD.  
The past competition among intelligence agencies, for purposes such as recognition and 
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self-preservation, will only impede the efficiency of the intelligence network.  The 
overall goal of MHLS and MHLD is to protect the homeland of the U.S.  Therefore, 
regardless of the actual organization conducting the mission, intelligence support remains 
the same.  An overall Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) will be created.  According to 
the Coast Guard, MDA is “the processing total awareness of vulnerabilities, threats, and 
targets of interest on the water”.28  Eliminating competition will ensure that both 
missions are supported with the same resources and professionalism. 
 
C. STRATEGIC LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FUSION 
Although the all-channel network allows direct communication between all nodes 
in the network, certain nodes must have dedicated missions to support the operations at 
each level of warfare.  The primary node responsible for the fusion of intelligence at the 
strategic level should be the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).  NMIC 
would be responsible for providing the strategic Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) of 
the domestic maritime situation to DHS, USNORTHCOM, and other strategically 
focused components of the network.   
NMIC, located in Suitland, MD, conducts surveillance of the global maritime 
environment and provides analysis on trends within that environment.  In addition, NMIC 
is a joint organization between Naval Intelligence and Coast Guard Intelligence.  This 
creates a strong tie between strategic support to MHLS and MHLD because of the co-
location of lead maritime intelligence elements of DHS and DOD.  NMIC has a majority 
of naval intelligence assets and personnel associated with it.  Due to its role of focusing 
on the global theater, as well as the domestic theater, it is best that NMIC continue to 
have a strong Naval Intelligence representation.  With a global view of the maritime 
environment, NMIC is a natural choice to provide strategic maritime intelligence fusion 
to both DHS and USNORTHCOM. 
NMIC currently maintains coordination with other intelligence agencies and some 
liaison officers as well.  However, direct liaison with all strategic intelligence 
organizations should occur at NMIC.  Representatives from agencies such as CIA, NSA, 
FBI should have a strong presence at NMIC, creating a strategic JIATF-type concept.  
                                                 
28 USCG.  “Homeland Security”.  www.uscg.mil.  2003. 
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This would encourage information sharing, and would bring about a better understanding 
of intelligence collection assets which the other agencies possess.  In addition to liaison 
with the other agencies, common information technology should be implemented in order 
to efficiently pass the strategic CIP to all other agencies in the network.   By pooling 
together various strategic intelligence resources for analysis and fusion, NMIC would 
give direct support to both DHS and USNORTHCOM through USCG HQ and 
NAVNORTH.  In addition, as a node within the all-channel network, all elements in the 
network would be given an increase in level of intelligence support. 
 
D. OPERATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FUSION 
The fusion of maritime intelligence at the operational level should primarily occur 
at the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC).  Ideally, there should be two MIFC 
nodes, one to support each domestic maritime theater.  Each should be responsible for 
developing the operational CIP within their respective theaters, and providing direct 
support to LANTAREA, PACAREA, NAVNORTHFLT-E, and NAVNORTHFLT-W.   
MIFC-PAC, currently operating in Alameda, CA, was established to support 
PACAREA operations.  The east coast version, MIFC-LANT, is to be established in the 
fall of 2003 in Dam Neck, VA.  These organizations are primarily manned and supported 
by USCG Intelligence assets.  This is the best approach since these nodes concentrate 
mainly on the domestic maritime environment.  Since the majority of intelligence 
personnel would be drawn from USCG, the MIFC would have no limitations on 
accepting information from both law enforcement and the foreign intelligence circuits, 
regardless of it being clearly associated with terrorism.  However, these centers should be 
joint as well.  Naval Intelligence should have a significant presence at each MIFC in 
order to facilitate transitions between MHLS and MHLD, and to ensure that the 
implementation of each mission can be supported effectively.  
In addition, each MIFC should also represent a JIATF-like concept.  Liaison 
officers from national intelligence agencies, as well as state and federal law enforcement, 
should be present in order to establish effective intelligence flow and information 
sharing.  Any agency that can provide information on the operational maritime theater 
should have formal connections to each MIFC.  Compatible interagency information 
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systems are important at this level as well.  Each MIFC should coordinate directly with 
the other MIFC, NMIC, LANTAREA, PACAREA, and NAVNORTHFLT-E/W in order 
to develop the operational CIP.  In addition, each MIFC would provide information to the 
all-channel network where overlaps between the warfare levels occur. 
An example of how the strategic and operational networks fit together is 
presented in Figure 9.  This is an all-channel design, and is difficult to present on a two-
dimensional drawing due to its three-dimensional structure.  While the figure does not 
necessarily illustrate the direct connection between all nodes, the three-dimensional 
interpretation of the figure connects each node to every other node in the network.  
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E. TACTICAL PORT LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FUSION 
Tactical intelligence fusion with respect to MHLS and MHLD should mostly be 
done at the port level.  USCG and USN assets conducting missions at sea will be 
supported by MIFC fusion, and the networking of organic intelligence elements within 
units themselves.  At sea there are fewer overlaps in jurisdiction at the tactical level.  Port 
security and defense, however, requires direct tactical fusion because of its unique 
environment.  This thesis proposes that the best method for conducting this is to develop 
a Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC).  The JHOC supports all elements within the 
port, and is operated under the Captain of the Port.   
Currently, San Diego has a prototype JHOC operating under the Captain of the 
Port of San Diego.  This JHOC was established to facilitate coordination between various 
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elements of the port.  Practically speaking, each port should develop and operate a JHOC 
which is tailored to that specific port.  It should be comprised of elements of Coast Guard 
Intelligence, harbor police, local and state law enforcement, private industry security 
services, and any other organizations associated with harbor operations in that port.  
Naval Intelligence assets and personnel should also be a part of the JHOC if the port has 
naval facilities.  If no naval facilities are present, Naval Intelligence should at least have 
some liaison in case Naval Intelligence assets are needed in that port.  An example of 
how a JHOC for a given port should look is presented in Figure 10. 
The JHOC should provide direct indications and warning to various harbor 
security forces.  Also, as a node within the all-channel network, the JHOC should connect 
directly with other JHOC units throughout the coastline.  This node represents the hub 
network hybrid portion of the all-channel network.  The JHOC is a hub where elements 
of a specific port’s security interact and pass information.  Communication and 
information sharing between operational and tactical levels is still important, as well as 
sharing between tactical port levels. 
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 Figure 10.   Tactical Port Level Domestic Maritime Intelligence Network Structure. 
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F. GAPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN CURRENT ORGANIZATION 
In the two years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2003, there have been 
many changes implemented which have increased the country’s ability to perform the 
missions of MHLS and MHLD.  That being said, there are still many gaps in the current 
intelligence organization that supports these missions.  There are three principal areas 
where the current organization falls short of being effective: 
 
 Organizational structure 
 Information systems 
 Misconceptions of the missions 
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The structure of current domestic maritime intelligence is a hierarchy, not a 
network, so that represents the largest gap in the organization.  There are, however, 
certain areas within the intelligence organization which are already forming hybrid 
hierarchy-network relationships.  Examples of these areas are the new concepts of MIFC 
and JHOC.  On all levels, many informal ties are being made between agency, law 
enforcement, and military personnel.  These connections rely on personal relationships, 
and begin to weave the web of a network.  While these personal relationships can provide 
short-term solutions, the connections should be made formal and be reflected in doctrine 
and practice.  In order for this to be truly effective, there must be organizational change in 
order to facilitate this new environment. 
It is surprising that the world of information systems impedes the progress of the 
intelligence organization performing MDA since the United States is creating most of the 
information technology with which the world operates.  One would expect that the home 
country of this technology would benefit most from its progress.  According to John 
Arquilla, there are three primary components of an information system; sensors, 
communications, and information input to weaponry.29  Only the first two components 
will be discussed here since information input to weaponry is very operations intensive, 
and the focus of this research is on intelligence only.  
While there are several gaps in domestic maritime sensors, one area stands out 
above all others in this research.  Sensors are practically non-existent in shallow water 
acoustics.  The potential underwater threat in domestic ports and coastal waters is 
significant and growing.  New technology has resulted in mini-subs and swimmer 
delivery vehicles (SDV) becoming available on the open market at affordable prices.  In 
addition, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) have become much more advanced and 
inexpensive in recent years.  Currently, the U.S. has no effective capability to sense or 
prosecute these threats should they be employed in a threatening manner in domestic 
ports or coastal waters.  In addition, underwater mine detection assets are very few, and 
often unavailable in many ports.  With the abundance of economic, military, and even 
nuclear targets located in U.S. ports, shallow water acoustics represents a significant gap 
                                                 
29 John Arquilla Class Discussion, Naval Postgraduate School.  2002-2003. 
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in sensing current threats.  The only way to monitor and predict possible threats in this 
environment is to invest in sensors that cover the shallow water realm.  
With regard to communications, there are still many problems in finding 
compatible means of passing information.  While this situation is starting to improve, 
there are many legacy systems which provide little value added in the overall collection 
and dissemination of intelligence.  These systems are incompatible with others, and 
definitely do not cross the lines of all agencies involved.  Security clearances can be 
problematic at lower levels, and when interaction between intelligence agencies and law 
enforcement occur.  This obstacle must be eliminated in order for the right group to see 
the information it needs to perform its mission in a timely manner.  In addition, security 
on current communication systems is often neglected.  Strong cryptology and information 
assurance is paramount in the increasingly complex world of information operations.  In 
order to truly build an all-channel network, interoperability and security of 
communications must be established between every node or the whole network becomes 
ineffective and vulnerable.  Creating interoperable communication systems, and 
protecting them with strong security mechanisms, is the only way to make the maritime 
intelligence network efficient. 
There are a few misconceptions of the missions of MHLS and MHLD that exist as 
well.  These misconceptions serve to detract from the overall mission effectiveness, and 
do not help the protection of the homeland of the United States.  The first misconception 
is commonly made by older generations in the Navy.  Many often treat MHLS and 
MHLD as the traditional mission of Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP).  The title 
of this mission sounds adequate, however, the execution of this mission in the past 
emphasized the protection of military forces from terrorism.  While preserving military 
forces is important, traditional ATFP cannot execute the missions of MHLS and MHLD.  
These two missions revolve around the idea of protecting the homeland and its citizens.  
Locking down bases and forces in order to protect them when a threat appears only 
makes the homeland itself more vulnerable to the swarming tactics of Netwar.  The 
citizens of the United States expect that the military will protect them at home as well as 
away.  In order for MHLS and MHLD to be executed to the greatest extent possible, the 
ATFP misconception must be eliminated at all levels. 
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The other misconception within MHLS and MHLD is the characterization of the 
threat.  Within many maritime components of DHS and USNORTHCOM, the 
“asymmetric threat” is characterized as merchant shipping.  While merchant shipping can 
represent a significant challenge to these missions, other areas such as underwater threats, 
mines, and maritime use of WMD need to be addressed as well.  Simply focusing on one 




The emerging domestic threat environment associated with Netwar provides some 
serious challenges in the prosecution of the missions of MHLS and MHLD.  To 
effectively support these missions, an all-channel hybrid network should be implemented 
for domestic maritime intelligence, with an emphasis on interagency architecture.  Within 
this network, the principles of information sharing, liaison and communication, and 
elimination of competition between intelligence agencies must build a foundation upon 
which to operate.  The networking of nodes such as NMIC, MIFC, and JHOC will allow 
proper support to be provided to each level of warfare, while ensuring that the overall 
network an still rapidly and efficiently operate.  Only by implementing changes in 
organizational structure and information systems, and by clearing up misconceptions of 
the missions of MHLS and MHLD, can the overall network be created in a manner to 
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V. CONCLUSION AND OVERALL SUMMARY 
A. REVIEW 
Throughout recent history, the United States has focused its Homeland Security 
and Defense missions away from the domestic theater.  A new threat dimension has 
arisen from the Information Age, which now challenges the United States in its own 
backyard.  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 illustrate the seriousness of this 
new threat environment.  Within this new atmosphere of significant domestic terrorist 
threat, the missions of MHLS and MHLD have risen in importance as never before.  
Intelligence support to each mission forces a significant change in the way that the 
intelligence community conducts business.  A new way of organizing the intelligence 
community can yield significant advances in support to MHLS and MHLD.  This 
reorganization must develop a highly networked domestic maritime intelligence 
community. 
While the missions of HLS and HLD reflect certain differences in definition, the 
overall goal of each is to protect the homeland of the United States against terrorist 
attacks.  The recent creations of DHS and USNORTHCOM have provided a C2 structure 
with which to conduct these two missions.  Under each respective command, USCG has 
the lead for MHLS and NAVNORTH takes over when conducting MHLD.  The resulting 
C2 organizations for both MHLS and MHLD are hierarchal in nature. 
The theory of Netwar, as described by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 
describes the evolution of network organizations based on advances made in the 
information revolution.  This theory proposes a progression towards the complex all-
channel network form.  Hierarchies have significant difficulty fighting networks.  
Therefore, with the enemy defined as a hybrid all-channel terrorist network targeting the 
homeland of the U.S., it will become increasingly difficult for a hierarchal intelligence 
community to effectively monitor and predict this enemy’s likely courses of action.   
With all of these ideas put together, it is clear that organizational change must 
occur in intelligence support to MHLS and MHLD.  This thesis argues that the most 
effective way to organize these intelligence communities is to merge them both into a 
domestic maritime intelligence network. 
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 B. KEY POINTS 
To monitor and predict enemy actions in MHLS and MHLD, a hybrid form of the 
all-channel network should be developed for use by the domestic maritime intelligence 
community.  This network should be all-channel in form, with certain hub network nodes.  
In addition, the ability to tailor, filter, and fuse information at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels must be implemented.  In order to effectively accomplish this task, 
domestic maritime intelligence must attain a joint-interagency form.  The foundation 
beneath this intelligence network encompasses the formal implementation of three main 
ideas: 
 Willingness to actively share information at all levels. 
 Creation of formal liaison and interagency communication. 
 Elimination of the competitive paradigm between intelligence agencies. 
The implementation of these ideas will allow a hybrid all-channel network to form in 
support of MHLS and MHLD. 
Within the network, each warfare level must be supported with dedicated 
intelligence fusion.  NMIC should be a dedicated node within the network, responsible 
for fusing intelligence at the strategic level.  MIFC-LANT and MIFC-PAC should be the 
two nodes in the network primarily focusing on fusion at the operational level.  Finally, at 
the tactical port level, each port should have a JHOC which is responsible for monitoring 
activity within each port.  As with the concept of the all-channel network, all of these 
nodes must become interconnected, so exchange of information can occur between all 
levels of intelligence support. 
The current intelligence organization has three major issues which impact its 
ability to adequately support MHLS and MHLD:  
 Organizational structure 
 Information systems 
 Misconceptions of the missions 
Within each of these areas there are significant shortfalls which endanger the homeland 
maritime domain each day.  By developing a maritime intelligence network, creating 
effective sensors and communications, and truly understanding the missions of MHLS 
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and MHLD, the country can begin to efficiently develop a safer domestic maritime 
domain.  
 
C. THE FUTURE 
As the Information Age continues to provide new information technologies, 
organizational practice in all aspects of life will move steadily towards the network 
principles.  Each day new technologies emerge from the corporate sector and provide 
advanced information systems which are widely available, easily portable, and 
increasingly affordable.  Within the past 15 years, information technologies such as 
laptop computers, internet, cellular telephones, and fax machines have been assimilated 
into practically every facet of life.  As information technology develops, so will the 
network form of organization.  Remaining hierarchies will suffer great disadvantages and 
defeats when encountering adversarial network organizations. 
The willingness to adapt organizational structure in intelligence will pay great 
rewards in the future support to security and defense operations.  Incorporating ever-
evolving information technology into highly networked organizations will pave the way 
for progress in the future.  “He who will not risk, cannot win” was uttered long ago by 
John Paul Jones.  However, his words still ring true today in a world which is becoming 
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